Key takeaways
On Oct 2, 2026, a Fifth Circuit panel of Judges King, Smith, and Ramirez decided Frankfort v. Metropolis Technologies, Inc. (No. 25-11168), in an opinion by Judge King.
The court wrote that the district court "misinterpreted the scope of Sec. 1692a(6)(F)(ii)," and affirmed the dismissal "on alternative grounds."
The court wrote that the district court "erred in concluding that the originator exclusion excepted Metropolis from the definition of 'debt collector' before determining whether Metropolis collected Violation Fines on behalf of others."
On the alternative grounds, the court wrote: "Appellants do not plausibly allege that Metropolis's principal purpose is the collection of debts, or that Metropolis regularly collects parking debts on behalf of facility owners."
The post says the opinion is about the allegations in one complaint against one parking company.
Status as of Monday, Oct 26, 2026: The opinion is dated Oct 2, 2026. The CourtListener docket for No. 25-11168, last updated Oct 3, 2026, lists the published opinion and judgment entered Oct 2, with the docket text "Mandate issue date is 10/23/2026," and no later filing. We couldn't check the Fifth Circuit's own docket, which requires PACER, or anything after Oct 3.
The short version. On Oct 2, 2026, a Fifth Circuit panel of Judges King, Smith, and Ramirez decided Frankfort v. Metropolis Technologies, Inc. (No. 25-11168), in an opinion by Judge King. It was an appeal from a dismissed FDCPA claim about parking fines. The court wrote that the district court "misinterpreted the scope of Sec. 1692a(6)(F)(ii)," and affirmed the dismissal "on alternative grounds."
Who this is for
Compliance, legal, and operations readers at lenders, banks, agencies, and servicers who follow FDCPA case law. It quotes the statute and the court. It doesn't say how the opinion applies to any program; teams often review that with their own counsel.
The facts are less glamorous than the issue: a parking garage and a mailed notice.
The statute, in its own words
15 U.S.C. 1692a(6) begins: "The term 'debt collector' means any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another."
It then lists persons the term "does not include." Clause (F) covers "any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another to the extent such activity ... (ii) concerns a debt which was originated by such person." The court calls that subsection (ii) "the originator exclusion." (15 U.S.C. 1692a)
What happened in the case
The court describes Metropolis as a parking operator that uses cameras instead of gates. A driver who doesn't pay by QR code gets a mailed "Notice of Parking Violation" demanding the parking fee plus a fine. The plaintiffs, Todd Frankfort and Curtis Goodban, alleged Metropolis was a "debt collector" under the FDCPA, claiming it "mails Notices through the U.S. mail."
The district court dismissed the FDCPA claim with prejudice. The Fifth Circuit says the district court held that Metropolis satisfied the exception "on the sole ground that Appellee originated the debts at issue." The parties hadn't briefed whether the fine is a "debt" under the FDCPA, and the court wrote: "We therefore proceed on the assumption that Violation Fines are debts."
The holding
On the originator exclusion, the Fifth Circuit wrote: "Given the plain text of Sec. 1692a(6)(F)(ii) and Henson, we hold that for a debt collector to successfully invoke the originator exclusion, it must (1) collect debts for another and (2) have originated the debts." Henson is Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 582 U.S. 79 (2017), which the court cites for its reading of the words "owed ... another."
The court added: "The district court erred in concluding that the originator exclusion excepted Metropolis from the definition of 'debt collector' before determining whether Metropolis collected Violation Fines on behalf of others."
The alternative grounds
The court then looked at the two ways the statute's first sentence defines a debt collector. It wrote: "Appellants do not plausibly allege that Metropolis's principal purpose is the collection of debts, or that Metropolis regularly collects parking debts on behalf of facility owners. Therefore, based on the allegations before us, Metropolis is not a debt collector for purposes of the FDCPA."
On the dismissal with prejudice, the court wrote that the plaintiffs "cursorily requested leave to amend" and affirmed. Its conclusion: "On alternative grounds, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court."
AccountsRecovery.net summarized the ruling on Oct 23 as finding that the company "is not a debt collector while rejecting the lower court's view that it was exempt simply because it originated the debts." That's a trade outlet's summary, not the court's language. (AccountsRecovery.net)
What this post doesn't say
The opinion is about the allegations in one complaint against one parking company. We're not drawing conclusions about other businesses, other facts, or other courts. The opinion doesn't address the statute's separate sentence on a creditor that "uses any name other than his own"; we raise it only because the statute does.
Open questions
None are answered in the opinion. Teams often take them to counsel.
Where does the team's own role sit in the statute's words?
Collecting its own debts, collecting for others, or both, and who wrote that down?
Whose name appears on outbound contact?
The creditor's, a vendor's, or an AI agent's? How is that documented?
Questions, answered
What did the Fifth Circuit decide?
It said the district court misinterpreted the originator exclusion, and affirmed the dismissal of the FDCPA claim "on alternative grounds."
What does the originator exclusion say?
It's 15 U.S.C. 1692a(6)(F)(ii), quoted above: it covers a person collecting a debt owed or due another to the extent the activity "concerns a debt which was originated by such person."
Sources & further reading
- Fifth Circuit, Frankfort v. Metropolis Technologies, Inc., No. 25-11168 (Oct 2, 2026)
- 15 U.S.C. 1692a
- Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 582 U.S. 79 (2017), as cited in the opinion
- AccountsRecovery.net, Oct 23, 2026
This post is for general information only and is not legal advice. It quotes a court opinion and a statute and doesn't describe how either applies to a particular program. Sources are linked above. Teams often review their programs with their own compliance team or counsel.