Key takeaways
On Oct 29, 2026, Judge Jennifer P. Wilson of the Middle District of Pennsylvania wrote that Section 227(c)(5) of the TCPA "does not provide a cause of action for the receipt of unwanted text messages," and dismissed Bronstin v. Happy Cabbage Analytics with prejudice.
The court found the Seventh Circuit's July 14, 2026 reasoning in Steidinger v. Blackstone Medical Services "persuasive." TCPAWorld's Oliver Shapiro wrote that, "As far as we can tell," Judge Wilson "became the first district judge in the Third Circuit to hold that a text is not a call."
In the eight days before, federal district courts in the Eastern District of California (Oct 21), the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Oct 21), and the Western District of Texas (Oct 28) denied motions that argued texts fall outside the same provision.
The Texas court described "a growing split among district and circuit courts on this legal issue." The Pennsylvania court referred to "the national split in authority."
The FCC's rule text at 47 CFR 64.1200(e) applies the Do Not Call rules to "telephone solicitations or telemarketing calls or text messages to wireless telephone numbers," and the Seventh Circuit said agency action under other parts of the statute was something "we leave undisturbed."
Matt Lippl, Chief Product Officer, PayPath | Reviewed by Matt Lippl
Last reviewed: November 2, 2026
Status as of Monday, Nov 2, 2026, CT: five rulings opened and read: one federal appeals court and four federal district courts, all from July to October 2026. Per TCPAWorld, the Third Circuit "has not yet decided the question since McLaughlin." Per the Texas opinion, "the Fifth Circuit has not ruled on this issue."
The short version. A federal judge in Pennsylvania held on Oct 29 that the TCPA's Do Not Call private right of action doesn't reach text messages, following the Seventh Circuit, while three other federal district courts ruled the other way in the eight days before.
Who this applies to
This post is for lenders, servicers, collection agencies, debt buyers, and in-house teams that text consumers, and for the compliance and legal people who review those programs. It reports what five courts, the statute, and the FCC's rule text say. It doesn't say whether any of it reaches a particular program. The provision in the cases, 47 U.S.C. 227(c)(5): "A person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection may" sue. The rule those regulations set, 47 CFR 64.1200(c)(2): no person or entity shall "initiate any telephone solicitation to" a "residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the Federal Government." The definition, 47 CFR 64.1200(f)(15): a telephone solicitation is "the initiation of a telephone call or message for the purpose of encouraging the purchase or rental of, or investment in, property, goods, or services, which is transmitted to any person." The same paragraph excludes a call or message "To any person with that person's prior express invitation or permission," "To any person with whom the caller has an established business relationship," or "By or on behalf of a tax-exempt nonprofit organization." The statute's definition at 227(a)(4) uses the same words. Which texts in a given program fit that definition is a question teams often take to their own compliance team or counsel.
Two texts advertising cannabis products, sent a year apart to a number on the National Do Not Call Registry, are now part of a national argument about what a "telephone call" is. The argument isn't new. What changed in October is how fast the answers came in, and how many of them disagree.
What happened in Bronstin v. Happy Cabbage Analytics
The opinion describes Happy Cabbage as "a marketing company specializing in the cannabis industry" that offers text marketing to cannabis companies. According to the complaint as the court summarized it, Asher Bronstin registered his number on the National Do Not Call Registry on Feb. 23, 2021. He got a text on March 9, 2022, advertising cannabis goods from a retailer called The Spot, replied "STOP," and got a reply saying he'd be unsubscribed. A second text came on March 17, 2023. Both numbers were registered to Happy Cabbage, per the complaint. Happy Cabbage said in a declaration that its client drafted the texts and picked the recipients, and that it had no record of a "STOP" request.
Happy Cabbage moved to dismiss on two grounds. The court rejected the first, a standing argument, writing that "Whether the plaintiff has sued the right defendant is a merits question, not a jurisdictional standing question." It granted the second. The memorandum's first line states the holding: "Section 227(c)(5) of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA") does not provide a cause of action for the receipt of unwanted text messages." The case was dismissed with prejudice "as amendment of the complaint would be futile."
What the court wrote about texts and "telephone calls"
The reasoning starts with the words. Quoting Steidinger, which quoted Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, the court wrote that in 1991 "telephone" meant "an instrument for reproducing sounds at a distance." Then: "Text messages do not typically produce sounds, so they do not fit within the plain meaning of 'telephone call'" in the provision.
It then compared the provision with the statute's own definitions. The definition of telephone solicitation covers a "call or message," while Section 227(c)(5), the court wrote, "only provides a private cause of action for individuals receiving unwanted 'telephone calls', not unwanted messages or unwanted telephone solicitations." It also pointed to a 2018 amendment that added text messages to a different subsection, 227(e): "Congress could have, but did not, amend" 227(c)(5) the same way.
On the FCC, the court said it "appreciates that the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") has interpreted calls under the TCPA to include text messages," but "is not bound by the FCC's interpretation," citing McLaughlin Chiropractic v. McKesson (2025) and Loper Bright (2024).
And on the head count, it "acknowledges the weight of authority that has held that texts are calls under the TCPA," then added that "the mere number of decisions reaching that conclusion is not dispositive." Near the end: "Congress can amend this statutory provision to include text messages." A footnote lists example decisions on each side, most of them from 2026.
What the Seventh Circuit said in Steidinger
Steidinger v. Blackstone Medical Services (No. 25-2398) was argued May 21 and decided July 14, 2026, before Judges Kirsch, Pryor, and Maldonado, with Judge Kirsch writing. The plaintiffs, per the opinion, "received marketing text messages and calls from Blackstone Medical Services, urging them to buy the company's home sleep tests." The panel affirmed a dismissal, concluding that the provision "does not permit plaintiffs to sue for the receipt of unwanted texts."
Two lines stand out. One: "modern-day text messages are better understood as messages, not calls." The other comes at the end: "Repeated, unwanted text messages are undoubtedly a nuisance. But they do not fall within the private right of action created by" Section 227(c)(5). The panel added that "spam messages may be curbed through agency action pursuant to other provisions" of the statute, "which we leave undisturbed."
Three October rulings that went the other way
Lewis v. Tenth Hall, Inc. (E.D. Cal., Oct 21). The case was "before the undersigned for all purposes on the parties' consent," with Magistrate Judge Allison Claire signing, per the docket entry. The plaintiff alleged texts on or about March 21 and April 9, 2026, to a number on the Do Not Call Registry. The order said the defense argument "is based on non-binding authority from the Seventh Circuit," relied on Ninth Circuit cases holding a text is a "call" (Satterfield in 2009 and Howard v. Republican National Committee in 2026), and wrote that "Courts in this District are not obligated to follow the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the TCPA." The motion to dismiss was denied. So was a request to certify an immediate appeal: "That the consistent authority in the Ninth Circuit differs from the rule of the Seventh Circuit does not justify an immediate interlocutory appeal."
Dovberg v. Haller Enterprises (E.D. Pa., Oct 21). Judge Joseph F. Leeson, Jr. Two texts on June 4, 2026, from "Haller Enterprises," offering "up to $250" for referrals, to a customer who per the opinion hadn't used the company since the summer of 2022. The court denied judgment on the pleadings: "The Court finds that Section 227(c)(5) of the TCPA provides a private right of action against unsolicited text messages." It found "the FCC's interpretations of the TCPA persuasive," cited three earlier Eastern District of Pennsylvania decisions, and framed the holding as preliminary: "At this stage of the case, the Court finds Section 227(c)(5) covers text messages in its use of the word 'call.'" A text search of the opinion found no mention of Steidinger.
Feliciano v. Red McCombs Hyundai Northwest GP, L.L.C. (W.D. Tex., Oct 28). Judge Jason Pulliam. The plaintiff alleged prerecorded calls and telemarketing texts to a cellphone on the registry; the dealership group moved only against the text count. The court wrote that "Recent TCPA jurisprudence reflects a growing split among district and circuit courts on this legal issue," that "the Fifth Circuit has not ruled on this issue," and concluded "the term 'telephone call' incorporates text messages under the TCPA." It said it "declines" the request "to follow the Seventh Circuit in Steidinger."
Who ruled which way: the five opinions we read
Only opinions we opened and read are listed. This isn't a count of every decision on the question; Bronstin's own footnote lists more on each side.
Case | Court and judge | Date | What happened to the motion | Which way, per the opinion | In the court's words |
Steidinger v. Blackstone Medical Services, No. 25-2398 | U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit (Kirsch, Pryor, Maldonado; opinion by Kirsch) | July 14, 2026 | Dismissal affirmed | Texts not covered by 227(c)(5) | "modern-day text messages are better understood as messages, not calls" |
Lewis v. Tenth Hall, Inc., No. 2:26-cv-1810 AC | E.D. Cal. (Magistrate Judge Allison Claire, on the parties' consent) | Oct 21, 2026 | Motion to dismiss denied; interlocutory appeal certification denied | Texts covered | "Courts in this District are not obligated to follow the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the TCPA" |
Dovberg v. Haller Enterprises, No. 5:26-cv-04286 | E.D. Pa. (Judge Joseph F. Leeson, Jr.) | Oct 21, 2026 | Judgment on the pleadings denied | Texts covered | "Section 227(c)(5) of the TCPA provides a private right of action against unsolicited text messages" |
Feliciano v. Red McCombs Hyundai Northwest GP, L.L.C., No. SA-26-CV-00200-JKP | W.D. Tex. (Judge Jason Pulliam) | Oct 28, 2026 | Judgment on the pleadings denied | Texts covered | "the term 'telephone call' incorporates text messages under the TCPA" |
Bronstin v. Happy Cabbage Analytics, No. 1:25-CV-01083 | M.D. Pa. (Judge Jennifer P. Wilson) | Oct 29, 2026 | 12(b)(6) motion granted; dismissed with prejudice | Texts not covered by 227(c)(5) | "does not provide a cause of action for the receipt of unwanted text messages" |
Same circuit, eight days apart
Dovberg and Bronstin came out of two federal districts that sit inside the Third Circuit, eight days apart, with opposite answers. TCPAWorld's Shapiro: "One district court decision doesn't bind another, and the Third Circuit has not yet decided the question since McLaughlin." He also wrote, of the head count, "Nobody wins a legal argument by show of hands."
Allison Haggerty at Bubeck Law put it this way: "For litigation, however, jurisdiction matters. Whether a text-only DNC claim survives may depend on where the case is filed and precedent in that court."
That leaves the open question this post can't answer: does whether a text-only Do Not Call claim can proceed now vary by district? None of the five opinions answers it for any program, and none says it's trying to. Questions teams that text consumers sometimes ask while it stays open:
Which of our texts are marketing, which are account or servicing messages, and who assigns that label?
Does each contact record show the channel, voice or text, separately from the campaign it belongs to?
Which state telemarketing laws cover texts in the states where our customers live? (Our Pennsylvania Act 47 post covers one.)
Who tracks new rulings in the circuits where those customers are?
What the FCC's rule text and the courts say about the rest of the TCPA
The cases are about one private right of action. The FCC's rule text at 47 CFR 64.1200(e) reads: "The rules set forth in paragraph (c) and (d) of this section are applicable to any person or entity making telephone solicitations or telemarketing calls or text messages to wireless telephone numbers to the extent described in the Commission's Report and Order, CG Docket No. 02-278, FCC 03-153." Steidinger said agency action under other provisions was something "we leave undisturbed." Bubeck Law's read: "These decisions address whether consumers can bring private lawsuits under one provision of the TCPA, not the broader rules governing marketing texts."
For a plain overview of the statute itself, see our TCPA glossary entry.
Questions, answered
Are text messages "telephone calls" under the TCPA's Do Not Call private right of action?
Courts have answered differently. Bronstin (M.D. Pa.) and Steidinger (7th Cir.) held 227(c)(5) doesn't cover texts. Lewis (E.D. Cal.), Dovberg (E.D. Pa.), and Feliciano (W.D. Tex.) held it does. The Feliciano court described "a growing split among district and circuit courts on this legal issue."
What did Bronstin v. Happy Cabbage Analytics decide?
On Oct 29, 2026, the court denied a standing challenge, then held that Section 227(c)(5) "does not provide a cause of action for the receipt of unwanted text messages," and dismissed the case with prejudice.
Is Bronstin the first court in the Third Circuit to rule this way?
TCPAWorld's Oliver Shapiro wrote that, "As far as we can tell," it is: Judge Wilson "became the first district judge in the Third Circuit to hold that a text is not a call." Eight days earlier, Dovberg (E.D. Pa.) went the other way.
Does Bronstin change the FCC's Do Not Call rules?
The opinion rules on the private right of action in 227(c)(5). The FCC's rule text at 47 CFR 64.1200(e) still applies the Do Not Call rules to "telephone solicitations or telemarketing calls or text messages to wireless telephone numbers," and Steidinger said agency action under other provisions was left "undisturbed."
Is the "do not call list" the same as the National Do Not Call Registry?
The FCC rule refers to "the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the Federal Government." The registry's site is donotcall.gov.
Have the Third or Fifth Circuits decided it?
Per TCPAWorld, "the Third Circuit has not yet decided the question since McLaughlin." Per the Feliciano opinion (Oct 28), "the Fifth Circuit has not ruled on this issue."
Sources & further reading
Bronstin v. Happy Cabbage Analytics, No. 1:25-CV-01083 (M.D. Pa. Oct 29, 2026), memorandum (Doc. 50)
Steidinger v. Blackstone Medical Services, No. 25-2398 (7th Cir. July 14, 2026)
Lewis v. Tenth Hall, Inc., No. 2:26-cv-1810 AC (E.D. Cal. Oct 21, 2026), order
Oliver Shapiro, TCPAWorld, via The National Law Review, Oct 30, 2026
For general information only, not legal advice. Sources are linked above. Teams often review their programs with their own compliance team or counsel.
By Matt Lippl, Chief Product Officer, PayPath | Reviewed by Matt Lippl | Last reviewed November 2, 2026